The industrialization of China's special economic zone in Shenzhen is attributed to a large inflow of foreign investments for low-tech, labor-intensive manufactures. It is also at a comparative advantage for being adjacent in proximity and culture with Hong Kong. As China further opens up to globalization, Shenzhen is recommended to reform its industrial structure according to the strengthening competition in world trade.
NOTE: All data are for city proper.
(a) The original Shenzhen SEZ was 327.5 sq. kms and was expanded in 1993 to include Baoan County. During the study period, Shenzhen performed beyond the expectations of the central and local governments in attracting foreign investment. By 1994 Shenzhen had already utilized more FDI (close to $5.35 billion) than the targeted amount for the year 2000 ($1.50 billion), and the total amount of utilized foreign investment was close to $7.71 billion. The inflows grew very rapidly, especially after 1991 (see Figure 1) . A close look at the sources reveals that the success of Shenzhen in attracting foreign investment can be largely accounted for by the predominance of Hong Kong investment (see Table  2 ). In the period 1986 to 1994, a total of $1.45 billion worth of foreign investment was contracted, 78.1% of which was with Hong Kong investors. Why is Shenzhen so attractive to them? I believe it is a positive function of proximity in physical, economic, cultural, and political terms. Based on complementary factor endowments, Shenzhen offers necessary land and labor for Hong Kong industries seeking relocation to increase profitability and maintain competitiveness. Hong Kong, on the other hand, provides Shenzhen with services in trade and finance. Cultural proximity, reflected in shared ancestry and language, enables many Hong Kong businesspeople to use their kinship and networks for the benefit of their investment, and familiarity with the culture and conduct of business on the mainland also enables them to transcend some formal barriers. Because of such cultural proximity, Hong Kong has long been used as a "middleman" by other countries, particularly those in the West, in investment as well as technology-transfer projects. These economic and cultural ties have been reinforced by a political connection: Hong Kong returning to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997.
[ Does proximity to Hong Kong bias the composition of the foreign investment inflows to Shenzhen and dictate Shenzhen's industrial structure? I intend to show that Hong Kong investment during the study period was confined to low-tech and labor-intensive activities. Such a result can be largely accounted for by the nature of Hong Kong's industrial economy, as the major industries in Hong Kong itself were low-tech and labor intensive. In addition, lacking a strong industrial base and
Having excluded labor costs, government policies, and domestic market potential as the primary factors, it appears that the most important factor underlying Shenzhen's attraction to Hong Kong is the proximity and complementarity between them in physical, economic, cultural, and political terms. Shenzhen is situated next to the New Territories of Hong Kong, separated only by the Shenzhen River. Following the simplified entry/exit procedures, Hong Kong workers and investors could apply for multiple-entry visas. In addition, new entry/exit ports have been established at the border with Hong Kong, and a new passenger line operating between Hong Kong and Shekou in Zhenzhen(5) allows Hong Kong businesspeople to commute easily on a day-to-day basis to supervise their branch facilities or joint ventures in Shenzhen. This proves to be a unique advantage because of large savings in the costs of stationing expatriate staff in Shenzhen. According to an estimate by a U.S. joint venture manager, such costs could easily go up to a quarter million dollars per year per expatriate. The need for management supervision by foreign investors was especially strong during the early years when qualified management staff with appropriate technical training was hard to come by in Shenzhen and China. In addition, physical proximity has made it convenient for Hong Kong investors to coordinate supplies of components and parts. For instance, if there were a breakdown in Shenzhen, spare parts from Hong Kong could be obtained within an hour and fifteen minutes. Such convenience is particularly valuable for investors because China still lacks an integrated transport network. The physical proximity also provides Shenzhen's foreign investors with access to Hong Kong's quality producer services--design, marketing, training, consulting, after-sale services, banking, and insurance.
Economic and cultural ties, elaborated below, are reinforced by the aforementioned event of Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty. In the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1985, China promised to maintain Hong Kong's capitalist system and way of life for 50 years after 1997 under the principle of "one country, two systems." Beijing hoped to use economic interaction to facilitate eventual political reunification, and the creation of SEZs was part of its efforts to encourage commercial relations with Hong Kong. Hong Kong, on the other hand, regarded economic ties with the mainland as a means of cushioning its return to Chinese sovereignty in that Beijing realizes the importance of preserving the territory's political viability and economic prosperity throughout the transition. So for strikingly different motives, political proximity across the border has accompanied an increasing level of economic cooperation and investment flows from Hong Kong.
and trade links with the mainland. Investment in China via third-country subsidiaries was only allowed after 1986, although trading began earlier. It has been limited primarily to labor-intensive industries as investment in high-tech and heavy industrial projects has been prohibited. In 1992 Taipei finally took an important step by removing the requirement that firms had first to establish subsidiaries in third countries. Contrary to Hong Kong's motives, the interest in promoting economic and cultural ties with the mainland has been seen by Taipei as an alternative to political reunification, not as a means of achieving it.
Economic Complementarity
The most important element here lies essentially in the high level of complementarity in factor endowments, in both natural and human resources. Experience has proven that highly favorable factor-resource conditions exist for complementary development and inter-territorial division of labor under outward processing arrangements, leading to dynamic economies of scale that are mutually beneficial. To crowded Hong Kong, Shenzhen offers space, labor, and energy for the expansion of its industries, services, and tourism. Although China has a large reserve of some natural resources, it is really not a resource-rich country, especially in per capita terms. But land is relatively abundant and inexpensive compared to Hong Kong. The most important advantage of Shenzhen is its human resources--the availability of a large reserve of low-cost and disciplined labor. The majority of this labor force is unskilled or at best semiskilled, though most workers have had elementary education. This reserve mainly consists of rural surplus labor but excess workers from state enterprises have joined the ranks recently. Manufacturing wages in Shenzhen are much lower than those in Hong Kong due to differences in quantity and quality of the labor force as well as capital investment per worker. Given its special status, Shenzhen has also been able to tap into China's pool of gifted and skillful workers.
For its part, Hong Kong has strong advantages in capital and in production, management, and marketing skills. It is a major financial center of the East Asian region, with enormous capacity in raising venture capital and syndicated loans. For over three decades, it has specialized in several manufacturing industries with much success, including textiles, garments, electronics, and machinery, and its large trading companies and merchant houses have had extensive experience in world markets. Hong Kong has served as a trading partner, financier, and middleman for China, with many contacts taking place in Shenzhen. (7) Meanwhile, Hong Kong's rapid industrialization could not have been sustained without supplies of food, water, energy, and raw materials from across the river, generally at prices much lower than world levels.
The close economic ties between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, moreover, can also be seen as the result of industrial relocation based on joint production and a division of labor. Hong Kong was in a special position to take advantage of the opening up of China and the establishment of Shenzhen as an SEZ. Driven by the loss of price competitiveness in light export manufacturing resulting from high costs of land and labor, the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong began to undergo restructuring in the 1970s, particularly in the textiles and clothing industries. Such restructuring mainly took the form of production relocation to lower-cost countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and China. Shenzhen became an expansion outlet for Hong Kong's industries and the timing could not have been more perfect. 
Cultural Proximity
It is clear from the above discussion that the economic cooperation between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and China as a whole, has been driven largely by market forces and functions. It therefore appears to be rather informal when compared to such blocs as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where institutional integration has played an important role in the intensified trade and investment links among member countries. But research shows that institutional arrangements such as tariff preferences may not be important for economic intergration. (9) Economic integration implies the lowering of transaction costs, and tariffs are often only a small part of such costs. Other human factors including cultural affinity and government regulations may prove to be more important. In the case of Hong Kong and Shenzhen, cultural and historical affiliations have significantly facilitated mutual development.
Shared ancestry is the most important element of the cultural proximity. According to official estimates, ethnic Chinese made up close to 98% of Hong Kong's population of 5.8 million in 1988, and about 40% of the present population was actually born in China, mainly Guangdong Province. (10) There are very strong links at the village and kinship levels, and the same dialect--Cantonese--is spoken in Hong Kong and Shenzhen as well as Guangdong but not elsewhere on the mainland. Many people in Hong Kong consider investment in Shenzhen as both a patriotic duty and a convenient way to help their relatives or friends. The tendency of Hong Kong businesses to rely on kinship network and personal ties in overseas operations can be seen in other examples such as their investment in Mauritius. Lower-cost labor and exemption from U.S. clothing import quotas provides some incentives in this island country for Hong Kong investors, but the most important draw is the existence of a small ethnic Chinese community. A few Hong Kong firms acted as pioneers and others followed; before long Hong Kong became the largest foreign investor in Mauritius's clothing industry.
As a result of the kinship network, Hong Kong investors have been able to obtain more favorable concessions than others from local authorities in Shenzhen, often not on paper but nonetheless real. The difference lies in the availability of the pre-existing social connections and the skilled use of reciprocal gift exchange, which requires familiarity with the local culture. The kinship network can be used to access local officials and develop new social connections, and these are reinforced through the system of exchanging gifts, either in material form or in services. In return, Hong Kong businesspeople receive favorable treatment by local officials in the form of information about, or access to, higher authorities or speedy handling of contract negotiations and approval. Such a gift exchange system usually works to the advantage of Hong Kong investors since local officials feel obligated to provide concessions after receiving gifts. Many investors from the West view this as corruption but Chinese, including overseas Chinese, do not necessarily see it in the same way as they take for granted that a big gift is needed to do business and maintain good relations. (11) Social connections may be instrumental in protecting Hong Kong investment from many problems in production, personnel management, and marketing. Under normal circumstances, a network of friends, relatives, and social connections conveys a sense of security for Hong Kong businesses that other investors may only obtain through more formal, official channels. However, the gift exchange system is not without disadvantages. It can be problematic for investors to decide among many local officials, provide the needed concessions, and face extenuated gift requests once the system becomes institutionalized. This system over the years has also led to an increasing number of Chinese officials taking large bribes and committing economic crimes.
Investors in Shenzhen from other countries are more likely to encounter such difficulties as cultural and language barriers, differences in negotiating practices, administrative bureaucracies, incompatibility in enterprise and labor management, different perceptions of job definition, and an inadequate legal infrastructure for business as well as the cultural bias against litigation. Ever since Hong Kong was acquired by the British to serve as a trading post to facilitate links with China, no major attempt has been made to isolate Hong Kong from China. As a result, local customs and traditions have been kept largely intact, including many business practices. One key common feature is management style: its characteristics include respect for seniority and hierarchy, group consciousness, importance of saving "face," and importance of personal . Another similarity appears in negotiation practices, which can be typified as slow in decision-making, manipulative in the use of friendship or guanxi, patience, skill in the use of pressure, and persistence in achieving mutual benefit. Hong Kong investors are more apt than others to use social connections and gift exchange to cultivate trust, allowing problems to be resolved as they arise, rather than pursuing lengthy negotiations often experienced by multinationals from other countries. The small scale of Hong Kong-invested enterprises makes them fit well into the bureaucratic society on the mainland. First, small investment projects only need to be negotiated with local authorities, which enables Hong Kong investors to utilize their kinship network and social connections that make negotiation easier, while projects with an investment of over $30 million must be approved by the central ministries. Second, small-scale enterprises, because of their flexibility, minimize economic risks associated with production in a formerly planned economic system. Research indicates that there is a tendency among Hong Kong investors to set up several small ventures instead of one major venture, so that success is largely dependent upon cultivating good relations with local people. (12) There is also a preference for establishing joint ventures with collective-owned enterprises and for helping relatives and friends start their own private businesses. 
Hong Kong-Shenzhen Industrialization
During the study period, industrial direct investment in Shenzhen was largely concentrated in several low-tech, labor-intensive subsectors, including textiles and dyeing, electronics, metal products, consumer electronics, rubber and plastics, garments, and glass products. Electricity and computer and electronic systems were the only exceptions among the top ten invested subsectors. Two manufacturing industries were the main beneficiaries of FDI inflows: the textiles and garment industries together received over 10% of all foreign investment, and electronics and consumer electronics over 8%. This pattern resembled that of many EPZs in Asia but unlike many zones that formed an industrial monoculture, Shenzhen was able to attract investment to other subsectors. The electronics industries in Shenzhen attracted a fairly significant amount of direct investment from Japan (about a third), and in the case of consumer electronics from the Netherlands (about 12%). (14) Most foreign invested industrial enterprises in Shenzhen were characterized by assembly operations and simple processing, with foreign firms sending raw materials or parts and components to the zone and exporting products back home or to a third country for further processing into final goods. This was demonstrated by the surge of capital goods imports from Hong Kong, the rise of re-exports through Hong Kong, and the low value-added of these enterprises. It was estimated that about three-fourths of Hong Kong's domestic exports to the mainland were products shipped for further processing. Meanwhile, Hong Kong's re-exports of Chinese origin to overseas markets expanded at a 26% annual rate between 1980 and 1992. Almost 80% of such re-exports were products of outward processing arrangements with Hong Kong firms.(15) Shenzhen alone accounted for 41.9% of all imports from China to Hong Kong related to outward processing between 1989 and 1994 (see Table 3 ). The case of a joint venture of U.S. origin producing electroplating materials offers a good example. The venture would take over semiprocessed products, which were 50% to 80% finished by the Hong Kong subsidiary of the U.S. firm, and complete the rest (personal interview). NOTE: Refer to the importation of processed goods from China of which all or part of the raw materials or semimanufactures have been under contractual arrangement exported from or through Hong Kong to China for processing.
Net output ratios of these enterprises were very low, ranging between 20% to 30%. As a ratio of net output value to gross output value, net output ratio is an approximate indicator of value-added. A low ratio shows that the input of the local industry was mainly labor, which performed assembly and processing functions dictated by the technology embedded in the production lines. This was particularly true for several major manufacturing industries in the zone that received large amounts of foreign investment inflows, including electronics, textiles and dyeing, metal products, and rubber and plastics. Only foreign enterprises in two subsectors, pharmaceuticals and crafts, had net output ratios higher than 30% in 1991. As a whole, foreign industrial enterprises had a lower net output ratio than all industrial enterprises in Shenzhen.
The sample of 1,621 foreign enterprises provides an in-depth look at the composition and sectoral distribution of direct investment from each source between 1979 and 1990 (see Table 4 ). With 1,427 enterprises, Hong Kong's dominance in direct investment can be clearly seen. An important finding is that investment from all three major sources--Hong Kong, Japan, and the U.S.--was largely concentrated in such low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing industries as electronics, consumer electronics, chemicals, metal products, textiles and dyeing, garments, machinery, rubber and plastic products, and glass products. Hong Kong invested in the widest range of sectors and industries--66--among all participating countries. Japanese direct investment was highly concentrated in the electronics industries; close to half of Japan's total registered investment went into electronics and consumer electronics, which amounted to over 30% of FDI in those two industries. The projects Japanese investment went to were larger than most, and its electronics projects were particularly so, averaging about $8 million. These included joint ventures by such major Japanese electronics manufacturers as Hitachi, Sanyo, and Crown. Production in Shenzhen has been very profitable for both Hitachi and Sanyo, and Sanyo has established several joint ventures with different Chinese partners there. The success of these ventures also attracted more Japanese investment to Shenzhen. U.S. investment has been focused narrowly, like that of Japan, and many projects were in fact sponsored by Chinese-American firms. As the largest source of investment, Hong Kong had a significant impact on the composition of the flow of foreign investment to Shenzhen, particularly in manufacturing industries. With the exception of consumer electronics and chemicals, Hong Kong investment accounted for over 60% of FDI in all of Shenzhen's top ten invested manufacturing industries (see Figure 2) . Specifically, over 96% of textiles and dyeing, 78% of metal products, 86% of rubber and plastics, 95% of garments, and 85% of electrical machinery joint ventures in the zone were financed by Hong Kong investors.(16) All were low-tech, labor-intensive industries and four--textiles and dyeing, metal products, garments, and rubber and plastics--were the top areas invested by Hong Kong. These four were also among Hong Kong's top six manufacturing industries (measured by gross output value) at the end of the 1970s, the other two being electrical machinery and clocks and watches. Clearly, Hong Kong's industrial structure was the determining factor that led to the dominance of Hong Kong investment in Shenzhen's manufacturing industries and the technological contents of such investment.
Hong Kong began industrializing in the late 1950s, driven largely by demand from U.S. mass merchandisers. Because of the small domestic market and limited resource endowment, Hong Kong's manufacturers from early on took the route of export processing, producing goods to others' designs and quality standards at minimum costs and maximum efficiency. Adopting a strategy of specializing in only a few of the several stages of the manufacturing process, they found a niche in the global structure of several labor-intensive industries by developing great proficiency in the management of large batch and mass production technology. A combination of consistent economic policies of free enterprise and free trade, an industrious work force, a well-founded industrial infrastructure, an excellent network of worldwide transportation and Export orientation tends to lead to concentration in a rather narrow range of industries. Hong Kong's factor resource endowment has given a comparative advantage to light and labor-intensive manufacturing industries producing mainly consumer goods. In 1977, Hong Kong's top six subsectors in terms of gross output were the labor-intensive industries mentioned previously, and five of these six accounted for over 76% of manufacturing sector employment in 1979. (17) The textiles and garment industries were Hong Kong's largest employers of the total manufacturing work force in both 1979 (42%) and 1991 (44%), and they were also the largest exporting industries, turning out between 40% and 43% of domestic exports during the 1980s. Electronics was the second largest exporter and employer, with a share of around 25% of domestic exports and 10% in manufacturing employment.(18) Domestic exports consisted almost entirely of manufactured goods, and the majority were low value-added products tailored to the lower end of markets and mainly from two subsectors, electronics and textiles and garments.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Hong Kong's competitiveness in consumer goods exports was being seriously challenged by several other lower-cost developing countries in the region including Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Rising labor and land costs in Hong Kong indicated that its export-led economy had reached a point where further growth could not depend solely on domestic factor inputs. Coincidentally, China began its course of opening up at almost the same time. This made Shenzhen, as well as south China, the perfect destination for Hong Kong's industrial relocation, and labor-intensive industries and/or low-end processing operations immediately made the move.
That domestic exports of producer goods from Hong Kong to China outstripped those of consumer goods was a reflection of the increasingly important role of Hong Kong-based outward processing in the mainland. Between 1989 and 1994, over 75% of all exports from Hong Kong to China in four commodity groups (timepieces, garments, toys, and textiles) were related to outward processing in China (see Table 5 ), and most of these industries were again Hong Kong's top invested areas in Shenzhen. It was reported that most electronics and toy manufacturing had been relocated to China by the early 1990s. While labor-intensive industries moved production to Shenzhen, technology-and knowledge-intensive stages such as designing, testing, and marketing tended to be kept in Hong Kong. Moreover, the manufacturing that stayed in Hong Kong started moving decisively away from labor-intensive production into high value-added exportable products that could compete on quality.(19) Instead of expanding horizontally as in the past, it had to move vertically through raising skill levels and productivity. NOTE: Total exports to China for outward processing by commodity group for this period refer to the exportation of raw materials or semimanufactures from or through Hong Kong to China for processing with a contractual arrangement for subsequent re-importation of the processed goods into Hong Kong. Hong Kong's technological capabilities were limited by the small size of the capital goods sector, whose development was severely constrained by the territory's limited land and natural resources, as well as by the small size of firms. (20) Moreover, in accordance with its laissez-faire economic policies, the Hong Kong government never actively undertook industry-specific R&D nor the development of strategic industries. As a result, Hong Kong's technological development lagged well behind that of Taiwan and South Korea by the 1980s. Hong Kong firms rarely exported technology in the form of turnkey projects or licensing agreements as their technology was relatively unsophisticated. Technology tended to be transferred through direct investment in the form of processes, products, and software including management, marketing, and training. Hong Kong firms also were usually not innovators and their technological development can at best be considered intermediate. Much of the machinery and equipment used in joint production or processing in Shenzhen was either imported from industrialized countries or taken from the factories of industries phased out in Hong Kong. Thus, technology transfer from Hong Kong to Shenzhen through industrial processing while tangible was very limited in sophistication.
The composition of Hong Kong investment subsequently affected Shenzhen's industrial structure, particularly in the export sector. For example in 1989, a number of manufacturing industries exported more than 75% of their output value, (21) and three of these--garments, textiles, and rubber products--were Hong Kong's top invested areas. On the other hand, exports from industries with higher levels of capital and technology, such as chemicals, oil refining, and communications equipment, amounted to less than 70% of their output value. A number of manufacturing industries that received significant foreign investment--including electronics, metal products, and consumer electronics--also exported less than 70% of their output and so produced comparatively more for domestic sales. The case of the electronics industry is particularly illustrative, as about only one-third of its output value in the late 1980s was exported. (22) Some service industry investment--mainly from producer services such as banking, insurance, consulting, and marketing--followed manufacturing industries to Shenzhen in an attempt to keep their old customers, a reflection of Hong Kong's changing economic structure. Manufacturing had been for many years both the territory's largest employer and its most important sector, but in the 1980s it lost its dominant position. Now, the tertiary sector accounts for almost 77% of output and 68% of employment, and Hong Kong is becoming the most service-oriented economy in the world. The scope of such service investment in Shenzhen, however, had been limited because those sectors were closed to foreign investment until the late 1980s. Shenzhen's growing income levels nonetheless have attracted Hong Kong investment in some consumer services such as retail, catering, real estate, tourism, and construction, as demonstrated by the absolute dominance of Hong Kong investment in the zone's real estate and hotel sectors.
Summary and Reflections
The success of Shenzhen in attracting a large quantity of foreign investment can be largely accounted for by its ability to attract Hong Kong investors. What Shenzhen uniquely offers Hong Kong firms is a production site right next door with long-established trading and economic links, people who share the same language and culture, and a common political future. This proximity is the primary determining factor underlying Shenzhen's success, and the Chinese government's decision to establish Shenzhen as an SEZ has been a winner.
Proximity to advanced economies with higher factor costs such as Hong Kong favors the development of SEZs over that of China's other cities. Without Hong Kong investment, Shenzhen might still be a small, backward town with little industrial development. It certainly would not have seen the rapid growth of industries that have been major benefactors of Hong Kong investment. Shenzhen's success has shown that joint production with an advanced economy such as Hong Kong can be a viable strategy for economic growth. This proximity also contributes to Shenzhen's popularity among investors from other countries as they can take advantage of the financial, trading, and producer services offered in Hong Kong but absent in China.
Historical affinity is also an important factor in attracting foreign and Hong Kong investment. Hong Kong investors enjoy abundant social connections in Shenzhen based on kinship networks and often obtain more favorable concessions from The proximity to Hong Kong has also significantly biased the composition, as well as the technological contents, of foreign investment inflows to Shenzhen. Hong Kong investment predominated in those sectors that had been important industries in Hong Kong; the five Shenzhen manufacturing industries that felt the greatest impact of Hong Kong investment were the same industries that in Hong Kong had had the most investments and had been the top producers. The causal relationship here is very convincing: Shenzhen's foreign invested enterprises, much like Hong Kong firms a decade earlier, came in time both to specialize in a few stages of the manufacturing process and be dominated by low-tech and labor intensive light industries.
It appears that Shenzhen's success in attracting foreign investment, particularly from Hong Kong, is not coming at the expense of other localities and should not be considered a zero-sum game for the country as a whole. The opening up of China and the creation of SEZs in the late 1970s coincided with the concurrent need of Hong Kong's manufacturers to restructure and relocate. Investment associated with this relocation could have gone to other countries in the region with low costs such as Thailand, and Malaysia, but Shenzhen's geographical, economic, cultural, and political proximity made it the choice of Hong Kong firms. In other words, Shenzhen was able to capture some investment flows from Hong Kong that otherwise might not have come to China at all. Indeed, despite its special, open policy, Shenzhen was not able to lure many investors from other sources.
As China opens further, Shenzhen's original role is nearing an end, and it needs to redefine its functions and seek new roles. It is already becoming a modern and relatively cosmopolitan city, so it will be unacceptable for it to turn into an industrial backyard or appendage for Hong Kong and other regional economic centers. Above all, it is important that Shenzhen maintain its export orientation because firms involved in competitive struggles for overseas markets are forced to become efficient, and this efficiency will be transmitted back to its domestic suppliers of inputs and gradually to the economy as a whole.
Hong Kong's restoration to China on July 1, 1997, has some significant implications for Shenzhen. Shenzhen's officials have two alternatives: accept the status quo or expand on the administrative line of integration with Hong Kong. Many are concerned that the second option will distance Shenzhen further from the rest of the country, which presents a large market and source of labor. Such concerns are justified since the next 50 years may be merely transitional for Hong Kong and its special status may fade as China opens completely. It is very likely that the division of labor between Hong Kong and Shenzhen in joint production will persist as long as labor and land cost differentials remain sizable. But as industries grow and mature, production costs rise, and land becomes scarce in Shenzhen, Hong Kong foreign investors will look further north for outlets for expansion. This move is already taking place, with the rise of Dalian as a major contender for foreign investment being the most noticeable. The strong industrial base, large market potential, abundant natural resources, better quality of labor force, and strong technological capabilities of the lower Yangtze River Delta region, which embraces the cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, and Ningbo, make it another major attraction for foreign investors.
At the Guangdong provincial level, the cities of Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Shantou, Dongguang, and Foshan have all experienced increasing levels of foreign investment. To compete effectively with other rising coastal open cities with substantial industrial bases, Shenzhen will need both to widen and deepen its industrial structure. As international experience shows, a city is most vulnerable economically when its economy is dominated by a few industries with a relatively narrow specialization. When those industries enter a decline because of either a secular trend or loss of competitiveness, the effect on the urban economy is quickly felt. Shenzhen may be able to avoid such a fate since it has already branched out into some higher-end manufacturing activities. An industrial targeting policy is already under discussion for Shenzhen and, once implemented, will push out many labor-intensive assembly operations. 
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